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Turnover falls with tenure — this is one of the best established empirical regularities 
of labor economics — but finding a tenure effect on wages seems to be very 
hard. Within-job wage cuts do not seem very uncommon either. We reconcile 
these findings by revisiting an old question: how gains from firm specific training 
are split between workers and firms. The division is determined by a stationary 
distribution of outside offers. The model is ex post monopsony: the lower a wage 
a firm pays to a specifically trained worker, the more profit it makes and the more 
eager it is to have her stay, but the more likely she is to leave. The optimal time 
paths of wages and turnover probabilities show that even if marginal product 
is increasing, wages need not be increasing; but rising marginal product always 
implies a falling turnover rate. 
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Most extant theories of the labor market predict that if specific training oc-
curs, increasing tenure on the job will both raise wages monotonically and cut
turnover. Since current empirical evidence supports very strongly the proposi-
tion that tenure cuts turnover but does not support the proposition that tenure
raises wages, we are left in a quandary: extant theory cannot tell us whether
specific training occurs or not. In this paper we resolve this quandary with a
new theory. If specific training occurs, increasing tenure must cut turnover, but
it need not raise wages monotonically. Current empirical evidence thus leads us
to believe that specific training occurs.
The early empirical support for wage increases with seniority was based on
evidence of positive cross-sectional association between seniority and earnings.
However, as Abraham and Farber (1987) and Altonji and Shakotko (1987) ar-
gue, this evidence is insuﬃcient to establish that earnings increase with seniority.
For instance, if high wage jobs (due to say heterogeneity of worker-firm match
quality) are more likely to survive than low wage jobs, then seniority will be pos-
itively correlated with high wages even though individual wages do not rise with
seniority. Using longitudinal data and corrections for various potential sources
of heterogeneity bias, both these studies find that the cross-sectional return to
tenure is a statistical artifact of heterogeneity bias, and that the true wage re-
turn to tenure is small if not negligible. However, a later study by Topel (1991),
also using longitudinal data and accounting for selection due to optimal mobility
decisions, shows that wages do rise with seniority. A recent reassessment by Al-
tonji and Williams (1997) concludes that Topel over estimates the returns, and
that wage returns to tenure, across all these estimation procedures, are modest
at best. Another noteworthy study is Ransom (1993) who finds that among uni-
versity professors higher seniority is associated with lower salaries. Other studies
using longitudinal data from personnel records of large companies, where mea-
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surement error is much less likely than in survey data, find that within-job wage
cuts are not uncommon either.1 In summary, this newly emerging empirical lit-
erature shows that wage dynamics are far more complicated and variegated than
the simple presumption that wages monotonically increase with tenure.
We reconcile these findings by revisiting an old question: how the gains from
specific training are split between workers and firms. The division is determined
by a stationary distribution of outside oﬀers. The model is ex post monopsony:
the lower a wage a firm pays to a specifically trained worker, the more profit it
makes and the more eager it is to have her stay, but the more likely she is to leave.
We solve for the optimal time path of wages and turnover probabilities. Even if
marginal product is increasing, wages need not be increasing; but rising marginal
product always implies a falling turnover rate. Hence our model resolves the
apparent paradox of the weak or nonexistent tenure eﬀect on wages along side
of a strong negative tenure eﬀect on turnover. Specific training should always
cut turnover, but there is no theoretical reason why it should always raise wages.
The model also shows why within-job wage cuts are a real possibility.
Before proceeding to a discussion of related theory, we briefly outline some
salient features of our model. First, the wage sequence a firm can oﬀer a worker
depends on the commitment ability of the firm — i.e. whether firms can be trusted
not to renege on a promised wage schedule since productivity increases on the job
are assumed to be firm specific. Our focus in this paper is on the no-commitment-
ability case or on self-enforcing contracts, and thus the main conclusions of the
paper are immune from charges of dynamic inconsistency. However, we also show
that if firms have complete commitment ability, then they will delay payments
for as long as they can. This is an argument for pensions quite independent of
disciplinary considerations.
Second, we study ex post monopsony and not ex ante monopsony as well. As
1See for example the study by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994).
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a consequence the model is silent about where outside oﬀers come from. How-
ever, our central assumption that workers receive outside job oﬀers is based on
the following considerations. The idea that workers receive outside oﬀers from a
stationary distribution rests on the job search assumption (Burdett 1978) that
workers have imperfect information about the location of high wage jobs (Stigler
1962). Jovanovic (1979a) gives this job search framework an equilibrium inter-
pretation by claiming that the distribution of outside job oﬀers is supported by
heterogeneity of match quality across all worker-firm pairs. The stationarity of
the distribution highlights the fact that the skills acquired in an employment
relationship are firm specific. We adopt the simplest job search framework in
our paper, namely, that workers receive a single job oﬀer from a stationary dis-
tribution in each period.2 The key question is the determination of the value
of a job oﬀer. We assume that firms oﬀer a self-enforcing wage schedule, given
a productivity profile, such that expected profits are zero. In other words, we
assume a competitive labor market for prospective workers. In this paper we do
not explicitly discuss how such a competitive market might arise. A more com-
plete discussion about job search and the market for prospective workers when
employment relationships generate specific rents can be found in Munasinghe
(2001).
Third, we assume that specific training is strictly learning-by-doing. It hap-
pens automatically as a worker’s tenure increases; neither firm nor worker needs
to make either decisions or sacrifices in terms of investments. As a consequence
our model is silent about layoﬀs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss
some related theory. Section 3 presents the model and main results. In section
4 we present some numerical examples based on specific distributions of outside
oﬀers to highlight the key results of the paper, including the possibility of within-
2Endogenizing search eﬀort would add greater realism to the model, but for analytical
simplicity we maintain the simple job search assumption.
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job wage cuts. A brief summary and appendix concludes the paper.
2 Related theory
The model in this paper is related to a variety of other compensation and turnover
models. The problem of wage determination when an employment relationship
generates firm specific rents has been well known since Becker’s (1962) original
idea of sharing the costs and benefits of firm specific investments as a means
of providing mutual insurance to each party’s investment. Becker recognized
the inherent ineﬃciency entailed in this sharing hypothesis by noting the “disec-
onomies” resulting from quits and layoﬀs that do not take into consideration the
resulting loss to the other party’s investment. Parsons (1972) builds on Becker’s
work by clarifying the role of specific human capital in the analysis of inter-firm
mobility. The key idea developed in his paper is that quit and layoﬀ rates depend
on the division of specific human capital into firm-owned and worker-owned com-
ponents, respectively, as well as on the volume of specific human capital. Parsons
does not focus on the sharing rule per se and thus his paper is largely silent
about wage dynamics. Hashimoto (1981) argues that the basis for precommiting
to a sharing rule is the transaction cost associated with ex post evaluation of
the worker’s productivity in the firm and elsewhere. One implication of this two
period model is that the wage in the post investment period will be higher than
the wage in the investment period, implying an increasing wage profile. However,
the restriction to two periods hampers his ability to observe interesting wage
dynamics.
These earlier models oﬀer interesting points of comparison with our model.
First, a result common to all these models, including ours, is the inherent inef-
ficiency of turnover. Second, the major diﬀerence between these earlier models
and our model is that in our model wages do not increase monotonically with
tenure even if marginal product increases monotonically with tenure. In the ear-
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lier sharing literature a standard implication is an increasing wage-tenure profile.
Recent empirical research has failed to turn up evidence of such profiles.
Mortensen (1978) focuses on the ineﬃciency of the sharing hypothesis and
thus considers various wage bargaining strategies — counter oﬀers and compensa-
tion as a precondition to termination — that might lead to joint wealth maximizing
outcomes in the presence of match specific capital.3 The joint wealth maximiz-
ing strategies generally predict lower turnover rates. However, the key result in
Mortensen is that although turnover declines with specific capital, turnover is in-
dependent of the division of specific rents. Hence the paper is not focused on rent
division and its eﬀects on turnover, but rather on joint wealth maximizing strate-
gies that might overcome the inherent ineﬃciencies of sharing rules. Hashimoto
(1981) observes that transactions costs of determining post-investment produc-
tivity are likely to be too great for such bargaining strategies to be compelling.
We also exclude ex post bargaining in our model.
Jovanovic (1979b) is one of the first theoretical articles explicitly to integrate
human capital theory and job search theory. In that sense, this paper is similar to
his. In Jovanovic’s model, match quality determines expected job duration which
in turn jointly determines optimal search eﬀort and investment in firm specific
human capital. Jovanovic’s central result is that turnover declines with tenure.
Although wages are endogenously determined in the Jovanovic model, as in the
model presented in this paper, his model is not designed to study wage dynamics.
The model here is explicitly designed to do so. Also, in Jovanovic’s model the
employer makes a wage oﬀer to the worker that is equal to marginal product. The
justification for such a policy is based on reputation repercussions. As Jovanovic
says, “employers oﬀering wages below marginal product will acquire bad repu-
3Munasinghe (2001) is also based on a counter oﬀer mechanism. That is, if a worker receives
a better outside oﬀer the current firm is allowed to match the outside oﬀer. This ex post
bargaining strategy leads to an eﬃcient turnover rule, but it also implies ineﬃciently high
search eﬀort. In the model presented here, we do not allow ex post bargaining.
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tations and will consequently not be sampled by workers” (p. 1249, Jovanovic
1979b). But firms that do not have the requisite reputation will need to oﬀer
time consistent wage policies. By contrast, wage determination is dynamically
consistent in the model presented here.
Our model also shares some parallel results with Black and Loewenstein
(1991). Their model is based on heterogeneity of mobility costs, and employ-
ers have monopsony power because it is costly for workers to switch employers.
Although the source of monopsony power in our model is specific training, and
thus diﬀerent, our result of signing bonuses in some cases is equivalent to their
result of front loaded contracts because in both cases workers in anticipation of
future monopsony power of the employer will demand higher wages up front.
Another interesting point is Black and Loewenstein’s claim that in the absence
of specific training wages are a decreasing function of tenure.4 However, in their
model setup specific training tends to increase wages as tenure lengthens. By
contrast our model can generate falling wages even when specific training is on
going, depending on the distribution of outside oﬀers.
The model presented here is closely related to an earlier paper (Munasinghe
2001) that is also designed to explain a variety of stylized findings related to
wage and turnover dynamics, including the following empirical puzzle: past wage
growth on a job reduces turnover, but there is no evidence of serial correlation
of wage increases. Although the model in this paper is not explicitly designed
to explain the above empirical puzzle, it does suggest that serial correlation of
within-job wage growth is likely to be a poor test of wage growth heterogeneity
if even wage levels sometimes decrease with tenure. This earlier model, like the
model here, assumes a stationary distribution of outside oﬀers, but unlike the
model here, it also assumes downward wage rigidity and ex post bargaining. As
4This result is similar to Ransom’s (1993) monopsonistic discrimination model, also based
on heterogeneity of moving costs, designed to explain the negative association between earnings
and seniority among university professors.
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a result the model in Munasinghe (2001) cannot theoretically address the finding
about within-job wage decreases. The model here explicitly shows why within-job
wage cuts can occur.
3 General Propositions
3.1 Notation
Time is discrete, and t designates the number of periods of completed tenure that
a worker has accumulated at the beginning of the current period. Let yt denote
the marginal revenue product of a worker who has accumulated t periods on the
job; thus y0 is the marginal product of a new worker. We assume that (yt) is a
monotonically increasing sequence; specific training occurs.
Let wt denote the wage of a worker who has completed t periods; we refer
to this as the wage of an age-t worker. At the beginning of each period (except
period 0) the worker receives an outside oﬀer. The outside oﬀer has a present
value of θ, where θ is a random variable drawn independently each period from
the same distribution, for which G(.) is the cdf. We assume that G(.) is strictly
increasing on its support. Stationarity reflects the assumption that it is specific
training that we are talking about; since the training aﬀects only the worker’s
productivity within the firm, there is no reason for the distribution of outside
oﬀers to change.
Let vt denote the worker’s value of optimal continuation with the firm. This
value is evaluated before the outside option becomes known. Assume the discount
factor is δ < 1, and that work involves no utility or disutility. Then
vt = E [max (θ, wt + δvt+1)] ,
for t ≥ 1, and
v0 = w0 + δv1,
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because the worker cannot receive an outside oﬀer before going to work (we take
this as a definition of what an “outside” oﬀer is). It will be convenient to write
xt = wt + δvt+1.
Then the probability that a worker quits depends on xt; specifically a worker
stays in period t if and only if θ ≤ xt (in the event of ties we assume the worker
stays).
Let ht, ∀t ≥ 1, denote the probability that an age-t worker stays on the job.
Then
ht = G(xt).
We refer to ht as the continuation hazard. Hence
vt = htxt + (1− ht)E(θ|θ > xt).








dvt = G(xt)dxt > 0 (1)
On the firm side, let Vt denote the optimal continuation value for a firm with
an age-t worker. Each period the firm chooses a wage oﬀer wt to maximize its
expected present value. Since the firm has no pre-commitment power, it can
assume that its future wages, wt+1, wt+2, etc., will also be set optimally and
dynamically consistently, and so can consider them as given when it chooses wt.
Thus we can think of the firm as choosing xt rather than wt. But since G(.) is
strictly increasing, it is an invertible function, and we can think of the firm as
choosing ht, the continuation hazard. Let F (.) be the inverse of G:
h = G(F (h)).
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Then Vt is given by the fundamental recursion equation
Vt = max
h
[h(yt − wt + δVt+1) + (1− h)V0], ∀t ≥ 1,
where
wt = F (ht)− δvt+1.
We can further simplify by writing Rt as the total rent from the relationship
Rt = Vt + vt.
Then the above recursion equation becomes
Vt = max
h
[h(yt − F (h) + δRt+1) + (1− h)V0].
Assume V0 = 0. We make this assumption because we want to study ex post
monopsony — monopsony after the worker has been hired and has acquired some
specific skills — not ex ante monopsony as well. So we must suppose that there
are many firms identical to this one bidding for the worker, and that if V0 were
positive even more firms would enter. The market for prospective workers is
competitive. This assumption is not crucial, but simplifies the mathematics, and
is consistent with much other theory in labor economics.
Finally, let R∗t denote expected surplus at time t contingent on the worker
staying on the job that period
R∗t = yt + δRt+1
Note that R∗t is independent of the firm’s action at t.
Then, the recursion equation for the firm is
Vt = max
h
{h(R∗t − F (h))}
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Let ht denote the optimal continuation hazard. Then
Rt = Vt + vt
= htR
∗






Bargaining and wage setting are somewhat diﬀerent in period 0. Since we
assume as a convention that no outside oﬀers are possible in period 0 (since there
is no “outside” until period 0 has been completed), we take the “continuation
hazard” to be undefined, since there is no relationship to be continued. Wages
have to be set to lure the worker in, not keep her from leaving, and our perfect
competition assumption implies that wages are high enough that V0, the firm’s
value of a new worker, is zero. Hence
w0 = y0 + δV1.
Since wages in period 0 are set by a diﬀerent process from wages in other other
periods, we will not pay much attention to them. They may include such things
as signing bonuses and initiation fees which are not our primary interest in this
paper.
3.2 The fundamental proposition
Now we prove that (ht) is a weakly increasing sequence: turnover always falls as
tenure increases.
Consider the firm’s optimization problem in period t, and suppose that it has
an interior solution. Then the first order condition must be satisfied:
R∗t − F (ht)− htF 0(ht) = 0
or
R∗t − z(ht) = 0 (2)
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where
z(ht) , F (ht) + htF
0
(ht)
Then the second-order condition
−z0(ht) < 0 (3)
must be satisfied.
We need two lemmas:
Lemma 1: ht is a weakly increasing function of R∗t .
Proof: First suppose that the solution to the firm’s optimization problem is
interior and so (2) holds. Diﬀerentiate (2)






which is positive by (3). Second, suppose ht = 0. Then ht cannot decrease in
response to a change in R∗t . Finally, suppose ht = 1. Then increasing R
∗
t does
not cause ht to decrease. This exhausts all the possibilities.
Lemma 2: Rt is a weakly increasing function of R∗t .
Proof: Since Rt = Vt + vt,
dRt = dVt + dvt.
From the envelope theorem and Vt = max
h





dvt = G(F (ht))dF (ht),






Lemma 3: An increase in yt+τ , for any τ ≥ 0 increases Rt.
Proof: Let τ = 0. If yt increases, R∗t increases and by lemma 2, Rt increases.
Let τ > 0. If yt+τ increases, R∗t+τ increases. By lemma 2, the increase in R
∗
t+τ
increases Rt+τ . That implies that
R∗t+τ−1 = yt+τ−1 + δRt+τ
increases. The increase in R∗t+τ−1 in turn increases Rt+τ−1, which increases
R∗t+τ−2, and so on, until Rt increases.
Thus we can write
Rt = Ω(yt, yt+1, yt+2, ...yt+τ , ...),
given G and δ, and note that Ω(.) is a weakly increasing function of each of its
arguments.
Lemma 4: (Rt) is a (weakly) increasing sequence.
Proof: Consider Rt and Rt+1.
Rt = Ω(yt, yt+1, ...yt+τ , ...)
Rt+1 = Ω(yt+1, yt+2, ...yt+τ+1, ...)
Since yt+1 > yt, yt+2 > yt+1, yt+τ+1 > yt+τ , ..., Rt+1 ≥ Rt, by repeated application
of lemma 3.
Proposition: (ht) is a (weakly) increasing sequence.
Proof: By assumption (yt) is a weakly increasing sequence. By lemma 4, Rt
is a weakly increasing sequence. Hence since
R∗t = yt + δRt+1
is a weakly increasing sequence, by lemma 1, ht is a weakly increasing sequence
also.
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Thus no matter what the distribution of outside oﬀers is, turnover decreases
as tenure lengthens. The value of the job to the worker F (ht) also monotonically
increases as tenure grows.
This doesn’t imply, however, that wages grow monotonically. Current wages
are only part of the worker’s inducement to reject outside oﬀers. The other part
is the continuation value. The continuation value may or may not be growing
faster than the total inducement that the firm wants to provide. Only if the total
inducement is growing faster than the continuation value will wages rise. This
may or may not happen.
We can also prove that turnover will be ineﬃciently high in this equilibrium.
This result, however, is well-known, intuitively obvious (since it’s monopsony),
and the proof would introduce more notation. We therefore omit it.
Turnover in this model depends on R∗t , the rent the relationship would gen-
erate if the worker turned down this period’s oﬀer. Specific training decreases
turnover because it increases rent. More specific training implies lower turnover
in the sense that a job where marginal productivity is higher every period than
it is in another job will have (weakly) lower turnover every period. Rent drives
turnover in Mortensen’s matching-oﬀers model, too.
The relationship between rent and turnover is first order, however, not second
order: bigger increases in R∗t do not necessarily correspond with bigger increases
in ht. This is because the function that links ht and R∗t is in general non-linear.
(Specifically, from (2), ht = z−1(R∗t ), where z
−1 denotes an inverse function,
but z and its inverse are generally non-linear.) Mortensen’s model also has this
property.
In one case, however, we can derive a result that resembles “more quickly
rising marginal product implies more quickly falling turnover rate.” Let (y0t) and




t ), respectively, be
the associated sequences of retention rates, all other parameters being the same.
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Then the following minor proposition follows almost immediately from lemmas
1, 2, and 3.
Proposition: Let y0t = y
00
t for all t ≥ T > 1 and y0t > y00t for all t < T . Then
h0t = h
00
t for all t ≥ T and h0t ≥ h00t for all t < T , with strict inequality if h00t < 1.
In other words, for any t, 0 < t < T , and τ , τ ≥ T , we have:
y00τ − y00t > y0τ − y0t,
the double-prime marginal product is increasing faster than the single-prime mar-
ginal product; and
(1− h00t )− (1− h00τ) ≥ (1− h0t)− (1− h0τ),
double-prime turnover rate is falling faster than the single-prime turnover rate.
3.3 Full commitment case
The sequence of wages that the firm oﬀers depends on its commitment ability. We
have focussed on the case where the firm has no commitment ability. However, if
the firm has complete commitment ability, then the solution to the firm’s problem
is trivial: it postpones payment as long as it can. In the appendix we show this
for the uniform case.
4 Specific distributions and numerical examples
In this section we show how the distribution of outside oﬀers aﬀects the sequence
of wages and of continuation hazards. We present one example with monotoni-
cally rising wages, and one example without.
4.1 Uniform distribution of outside oﬀers
If outside oﬀers are drawn from a uniform distribution, then (except possibly be-
tween period 0 and period 1), wages will rise monotonically, and then be constant
(if marginal product rises high enough).
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Assume that each period’s outside oﬀer θ is distributed uniformly on the unit
interval. Then xt = ht when both are less than or equal to 1, and so the firm’s
problem is to choose h to maximize
h(R∗t − h)
subject to h ≤ 1.
The solution to this problem has two phases. If R∗t ≤ 2, then ht = 12R∗t ≤ 1.
We call this the low-rent phase. If R∗t ≥ 2, then ht = 1. We call this the high-rent
phase. Since R∗t is increasing, the low-rent phase (if there is one) always precedes
the high-rent phase (if there is one). During the high-rent phase, the worker is
so valuable that the firm assures that she never leaves.
We examine the high-rent phase first. Since the worker never leaves, R∗t = Rt,
which is simply the present value of future output. For algebraic simplicity,








where we assume δg < 1 to assure convergence. Then a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for period t to be in the high-rent phase is
yt ≥ 2(1− δg).
Let T denote the first period in the high-rent phase, and for algebraic sim-
plicity, assume
yT = 2(1− δg).
Then xT = hT = 1, RT = R∗T = 2, vT = VT = 1, and wT = 1− δ.
At period T , surplus is split evenly between firm and worker. However, after
period T , the relationship continues to grow more valuable, but the firm no longer
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needs to pay the worker more, since no outside firm can top what the worker is
receiving. Thus, after T , VT continues to grow but vt remains at one, and wages
remain the same.
In the low-rent phase, quitting is possible. Then










































δh2t+1, t ≥ 1.
Since








δ(1− h2t+1), t ≥ 1. (4)
These are the fundamental equations for the uniform case.
Since ht+1 increases as t increases, it is clear from (4) that wages increase
during the low-rent phase (for t ≥ 1), and increase at a faster rate than output.
But they stagnate when the high-rent phase is reached, even though output keeps
rising.
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For a numerical example, we take g = 1.02 (2% growth in output per period),
δ = .8 (discount rate of 25%), and y0 = 13 . Then the high-rent phase begins at
period 5, with y5 = .368. The sequence of wages and hazard rates in the low-rent
phase is shown in figure 1.
Figure 1
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ht .8767 .9190 .9536 .9804 1 1 1 1 1 1
wt .1389 .1553 .1691 .1804 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2 .2
yt .3400 .3468 .3537 .3607 .368 .375 .383 .391 .398 .406
In period 0, in order to bring V0 = 0, we have w0 = .9549, a large signing
bonus is provided. Of course, if marginal product were not so smoothly rising,
the bonus would not have to be paid. For instance, if the firm had to incur hiring
and start-up costs so that net product in period 0 were −.4760, zero-period wages
would be the same as first period wages.
Although wages are monotonically rising, except for the signing bonus, there
is no simple sharing rule. Wages as a proportion of current output rise from
.41 in period 1 to .54 in period 5, and then fall throughout the high-rent phase,
asymptotically approaching zero.
4.2 A two-point distribution of outside oﬀers
Now suppose that the outside oﬀer can take one of only two values: θl with
probability p, and θh with probability (1 − p), θh > θl. (Strictly speaking, this
distribution violates our assumption of a strictly increasing cdf, but it can be
approximated closely by a distribution with an increasing cdf, and the results will
be arbitrarily close to the results here.) With this distribution, the continuation
hazard is weakly monotonically increasing, but the wage is not.
With the two-point distribution, we have
F (1) = θh, F (p) = θl, F (0) = 0
19
and the firm’s problem is to choose h to maximize
Vt = R
∗
t − θh if h = 1
= (R∗t − θl)p if h = p
= 0 if h = 0.
If for any t R∗t < θl, the relationship will never continue or never begin, and so
we ignore this possibility.




then ht = 1 and the worker never leaves. This is the high-rent phase. If not,
ht = p, and the worker leaves whenever the outside oﬀer is high. This is the
low-rent phase.






as before, since the relationship will last forever. Continuing in employment need
only be as good as the high outside oﬀer, and so
vt = θh, wt = (1− δ)θh.
Let T denote the first period of the high-rent phase. In the low-rent phase,
the value of the relationship to the worker has to be the same as the low outside
oﬀer:
xt = wt + δvt = θl,
and
vt = pθl + (1− p)θh , θ.
Thus if (t+ 1) is also in the low-rent phase
wt = θl − δθ.
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however if (t+ 1) = T so that the next period is in the high-rent phase,
wT−1 = θl − δθh < θl − δθ.
Thus wages fall between periods (T −2) and (T −1). As the anticipated high
wages of the high-rent phase get closer, the firm needs to pay less in current wages
to beat the low outside oﬀers because the future is so bright. So the time path of
wages is not monotonic, even though marginal product is rising monotonically.
Even though wages are not weakly monotonic in this example, the continu-
ation hazard is. It is p < 1 throughout the low rent phase, and then rises to
one.
To return to the numerical example discussed in the previous section, suppose
that all output and discounting variables remain the same, but that instead of
a uniform distribution of outside oﬀers, the outside oﬀer is either θl = 1 with
probability .75 or θh = 1.25 with probability .25. These values have been chosen
so that the high-rent phase begins at period 5, just as before.
Then the wage stays constant for periods 1 through 3, dips in period 4, and
rises to a plateau in period 5. Figure 2 illustrates.
Figure 2
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ht .75 .75 .75 .75 1 1 1 1 1 1
wt .0625 .0625 .0625 0 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25 .25
yt .3400 .3468 .3537 .3607 .368 .375 .383 .391 .398 .406
The signing bonus in period 0 is .7895.
As in the uniform distribution case, there is no constant sharing rule; the ratio
of wage to output varies from period to period. The ratio, however, goes down
during the low-rent phase rather than up.
In comparing the two, very diﬀerent wage and turnover profiles, it is important
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to remember that marginal product follows the same profile in each case.5 The
time profile of wages is thus a very poor indicator of the time profile of underlying
productivity. The tenure-turnover profile is also a poor indicator, but not quite
so bad, since at least it has the direction right.
5 Conclusion
We present a model to reconcile recent findings on wage and turnover dynamics.
Although the evidence of a positive cross-sectional association between earnings
and seniority is widespread, the fairly recent use of longitudinal data have allowed
researchers to address whether individual wages do rise with seniority. Somewhat
surprisingly the evidence on wage changes with tenure appear to be far more var-
iegated than the simple presupposition that wages rise with seniority. Average
wage increases with tenure appear to be small if not negligible and within-job
wage decreases are not uncommon either. The challenge to theory is to reconcile
this complex picture of wage dynamics with the fact that the negative relation
between turnover and tenure remains as ubiquitous as ever. Our model, built
on the workhorse theories of specific training, job search, and self-enforcing con-
tracts, shows that even if marginal product is increasing due to specific training,
wages need not be increasing; but rising marginal product always implies a falling
turnover rate.
6 Appendix: Complete commitment case
With complete commitment ability, the solution to the firm’s problem is trivial:
it postpones payment as long as it can. It is easiest to understand this conclusion
if we impose the restriction that no worker can work for more than T ∗ periods
5This divergence remains even if the expected vaue of outside oﬀers is the same. For instance
with θh = .8, θl = .4, p = .75, (so Eθ = .5 as in the uniform case) the high-rent phase still
begins with period 5, but low-rent phase wages are negative. (The low-rent phase is a training
period where the worker pays tuition.)
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— for biological reasons, say. Then the firm’s problem is to choose a sequence of
wages (wt), t = 0, ..., T ∗, that maximizes the expected present value of its profit.
Let V0 denote this objective function - evaluated, as it must be, just as a worker
is hired. We assume outside oﬀers are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.
It is easiest and most intuitive to consider the case T ∗ = 1 first. Then
V0 = max
w0,w1
[(y0 − w0) + δ {w1 (y1 − w1) + (1− w1)V0}]
for t ≥ 1. Clearly profit is maximized by setting w0 = 0 (optimal w1 is more
diﬃcult to calculate). Increases in w0 merely reduce first period profits; they do
not increase period 1 retention because they are just irrelevant history when the
worker has to make his period 1 decision.
Now consider T ∗ = 2. Clearly w0 = 0. The probability of not quitting at the
beginning of period is
x1 = w1 + δv2
where v2 is an increasing function of w2, and can be made as large as desired,
up to a maximum of one, by making w2 suﬃciently large for any value of w1.
Conditional on not quitting at the beginning of period 1, the value of additional
profit is
π1 (w1, w2) = y1 − w1 + δ (w2 (y2 − w2) + (1− w2)V0) .
But π1 is clearly maximized by setting w1 = 0 since any desired value of x1
can be obtained by setting w1 = 0 and making w2 suﬃciently large. Optimal
wage scheme has w1 = 0, since profits after period zero depend only on x1 and
π1.
By repeated arguments like this we can establish that optimal wage schemes
when the firm has unlimited commitment power have positive payments only in
the last period; these schemes have maximum retentive power for any expected
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